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Abstract 
 
In this paper I use county to county migration data to estimate the effect 
of labour market conditions on these flows. A gravity model is 
estimated on Hungarian NUTS 2 regions for the period between 1994 
and 2002. Such results are not available for Hungary so far. Estimated 
parameters show significant and expected effects of local amenities, 
distances and labour market conditions. Although the magnitude of the 
estimated parameters is not small, they are not sizeable enough to 
compensate for the overall low level of migration. 
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MAGYAR TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA 
KÖZGAZDASÁGTUDOMÁNYI INTÉZET 
 
 
 
 
CSERES-GERGELY ZSOMBOR 
MEGYÉK KÖZÖTTI VÁNDORLÁS ÉS MUNKAPIACI HELYZET 
MAGYARORSZÁGON 1994 ÉS 2002 KÖZÖTT 
Összefoglaló 
 
Ez a tanulmány megyék közötti vándorlási adatokra támaszkodva kísér-
li meg a munkapiaci ösztönzők migrációra gyakorolt hatását számsze-
rűsíteni. Az 1994 és 2002 közötti időszakra gravitációs modellt becsü-
lünk megyei szinten – tudomásunk szerint ilyen eredmények még nem 
állnak rendelkezésre Magyarországra vonatkozólag. A modell becsült 
paraméterei a várakozással megegyező előjelűek és szignifikánsak úgy 
a regionális jellemzők és a távolság, mint a munkapiaci jellemzők ese-
tében. Noha a becsült paraméterek közgazdaságilag is számottevőek, a 
munkapiaci ösztönzők változásának releváns tartományában így sem 
implikálnak olyan reakciót, ami a migráció jelenlegi alacsony szintjét 
érdemben megváltoztatná. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Város-, vidék-, és regionális közgazdaságtan; Lakáshely-
zet; Szállítás; Ökonometriai és Input-Ouptput modellellek; Egyéb mo-
dellek, regionális migráció, regionális munkerő piac, népesség 
  
 

  
INTRODUCTION 
Hungary, along with other Central and Eastern European countries, performed 
well around the beginning of the new millennium in terms of economic growth. 
Behind the increase of average performance however, there is a substantial 
amount of dispersion in both output and opportunities. In 2002 the best county1 
in terms of GDP produced 4 times the output of the poorest one (Győr and Nóg-
rád, respectively, not counting Budapest and Pest county among the best, which 
are far ahead)2. Labour market opportunities show less pronounced, but quite 
substantial heterogeneity. The lowest employment rate of the population 
between 15 and retirement age3 is 45 percent (Szabolcs), whereas the highest is 
66 percent (Zala). Average earnings vary even more, although this variation is 
again smaller if we exclude Budapest from the comparison, but there is still 50 
percent difference between average wages in the poorest Szabolcs or Békés and 
the top performer Fejér or Győr (again excluding Budapest and Pest county). 
Although differences in wages shrink substantially if we control for 
compositional effects, the same is not true for employment opportunities (see 
Nagy 2004 and Köllő 2004 on this matter). Because average wages and 
employment opportunities are correlated in space, the question arose over and 
over the past years: what will be the mechanism, if any, that equilibrates these 
differences?  
Regional differences are only partly increasing over time. Figure 1 shows the 
normalised coefficient of variation of average wages and employment rates at 
the county-level. After a moderate increase from 1993, differences in 
employment rates are stagnant from 1997 on. Differences in average wages on 
the other hand, were increasing steadily from around 1995, following the overall 
growth of the economy. 
 
                                                 
1 Counties are the NUTS 2 regions in Hungary, a regional unit one level below what is called 
a (NUTS 1) “region” in the EU. There are 20 counties, and Budapest, the capital is one of 
them. 
2 This grows to a 30-fold difference if we include Budapest and Pest county. This procedure 
however can be misleading. There are firms who have separate firms for their plants and 
acitivities, but many of them has a headquarter in Budapest acting as a profit centre. 
3 Although the earliest retirement age is increasing from 1997 on, the effective one did not 
change much from 55 (females) and 60 (males) years of age, due to several legally provided 
early retirement opportunities. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of labour market inequality in Hungary after 1990 
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Source: Own calculations from the Wage Survey, and the Labour Force Survey 
If prices of the same good are not the same in different, but interconnected 
markets, we can expect that such a difference will vanish over some time as a 
result of goods or factors being transported to and sold in places where their 
price is high. Regional differences should be no exception – in space, this 
arbitrage can happen through the relocation of capital and labour. Although 
there is a slight sign of change in this trend recently, Barta (2004) for example 
shows that it is the most western and richest counties of Hungary that attracted 
most foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s, a core factor in both regional 
and country-level economic performance. Eastern parts of the country, where 
many low wage and low employment regions are located, seem to be left behind 
in this respect. This can possibly be attributed to spatial differences in the 
inherited industrial structure and knowledge that proved to be valuable after the 
economic transformation, amplified by favourable spillover effects, as recent 
evidence by Békés (2004) shows. Regardless of the reason, location choices of 
foreign firms show that FDI and capital in general has not only been favouring 
already advanced regions, but it is not too mobile either when it comes to 
within-country relocation. If firms are reluctant to initiate an equilibrating 
process by using workforce from depressed regions, it is migration of the 
population that can work towards diminishing regional differences. 
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MOBILITY IN HUNGARY 
The Hungarian society is not a mobile one. It is around 4 percent of the 
population that changes residence during a year such that the registered address 
is in a new municipality. This includes those moving their permanent address 
and also those moving only their temporary one. Thinking about regional 
differences and migration, it is probably the former type we would like to 
consider, as it is permanent migrants who commit to bind their life to a given 
region. Temporary movers might also have motives that ultimately lead to 
diminishing regional differences, but being a very heterogeneous population, 
they need consideration that available data does not make possible.4 Looking at 
only permanent movers, the mobility rate halves to around 2 percent. But again, 
if we are interested in regional inequalities, probably only those migrants are 
relevant, who cross the boundaries of the chosen regional units and not those 
who move from a core city to the surrounding green belt. 
Figure 2: Evolution of labour market inequality in Hungary after 1990 
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Source: Own calculations from various issues of the Demographic Yearbook, 
Hungarian Statistical Office; See the main text for the definition of the various 
concepts. 
                                                 
4 Cseres-Gergely (2004) notes that seasonal fluctuations in the number of such people 
indicates that a large share of them can be students. Despite of such concerns, I attempted to 
estimate the model presented later on temporary migrants. This, as opposed to the case of 
permanent ones, produced very different and unexpected results. 
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Partly because of substantial reasons, partly because of data availability, I am 
looking at county-level differences and migration. The substantial reason for 
using counties (or rather: any unit above the settlement-level) is that relocation 
to suburbs and the formation of suburban agglomerations is a dominant feature 
of the Hungarian mobility pattern. Although such processes can have economic 
and indeed labour market related aspects (such as sorting by skill, see 
Brueckner/Thisse/Zenou 2002, for example), this is not something we are 
interested here. If however we consider only those permanent movers, who cross 
the boundaries of counties (who will be called migrants hereafter), we obtain a 
migration rate of 1 percent. This figure is rather low, no matter what comparison 
we consider, and is almost constant over time (see Figure 2 for a comparison). 
 
We can look at the low mobility figures from a different, a spatial point of view. 
I have already noted that one great drop in the mobility rate occurs as we restrict 
attention to those crossing county borders. To explore that idea further, one can 
look at how much of the intensity of mobility is changing with the distance 
spanned. Locations are different, however. People at central locations have no 
chance to cross the longest distances, but have more possibilities to go to shorter 
ways, and those in remote areas have a greater selection of distances, but with a 
smaller set for each. Because of this, the measured intensities are shaped by the 
choice set as well. To filter out this effect, we can divide the observed migration 
proportions by the proportion of routes to a given distance, thereby reducing the 
dominance of potentially more frequent routes and get the pure effect of choice. 
Figure 3 depicts both the uncorrected and the corrected (and normalised) 
intensities for the period between 1992 and 2002. As we have already seen, 
around 50 percent of all moves happen within a county and yet again 50 percent 
of the remaining moves happen between adjacent counties. Reaching developed 
areas from underdeveloped ones often requires crossing at least one full county, 
but mostly more – only a very small proportion of migration reaches that far. 
 
6 
  
Figure 3: Migration intensities by proximity between 1992 and 2002 in 
Hungary. 
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Source: Own calculations from various issues of the Demographic Yearbook, 
Hungarian Statistical Office; Using own county-proximity indicators 
 
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE 
Literature on Hungarian migration is quite sparse, and studies framed in an 
economic context are hard to find. On the one hand, we have a handful of quite 
accurate descriptions of migration from the demographers’ point of view – these 
mostly appeared in a volume edited by Illés and Tóth (1998). Such studies point 
out a number of interesting features of mobility and migration, such as its 
relation to suburban development, the demise of the migration of low skilled 
workers, or the phenomenon of migrant-commuters. They do not however offer 
conclusions about labour market effects. 
Among the few that do elaborate on economic effects, we find first the study of 
Kertesi (2000), who – looking at commuting in the same paper – models gross 
and net migration flows out and into settlements between 1990 and 1994. 
Including proxies for labour market characteristics, such as the number of 
companies, local average income, unemployment rate and commuting 
possibilities, Kertesi estimates a simultaneous equation system of in- and 
outmigration. Push and pull forces are connected to economic motives; density 
of enterprises and tax paid per taxpayer being important pull, whereas 
unemployment, share of agricultural employment, different types of commuting 
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behaviour and the proportion of gipsy population are the most important push 
factors. Although it is not clear from a theoretical point of view, why the 
specific variables enter the equations and why in the proposed configuration, the 
results are appealing and are in line with evidence from other sources. 
Nevertheless it is not clear, whether results from the early 1990s are valid today. 
A second study is due to Fidrmuc (2002), who looks at gross out- and 
immigration flows in several then acceding countries, including Hungary, and 
also in some EU member countries as a benchmark. Running linear regressions 
with out-, in- and net-migration rates of counties as the dependent variable on 
county-level data for the period between 1994 and 1998, three main findings 
emerge. Firstly, it is only net migration that seems to respond to wages and 
unemployment rates in the expected way, i.e. such that higher wages 
encourages, while higher unemployment discourages in- and net migration to a 
region. Results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are comparable to 
responsiveness obtained from Italy, but still not very significant in economic 
terms. Secondly, it seems that the effect of wages is nonlinear, high wage 
regions receiving disproportionately high share of migrants. Thirdly, it seems 
that Budapest (and also Pest county) behaves in a peculiar way that is not 
comparable to other counties. 
In a third paper, Cseres-Gergely (2004) attempts to quantify the effect of wages 
and unemployment on migration using individual-level data. Based on 
individual-level data from the 1996 Microcensus of the Hungarian Statistics Of-
fice (HCSO), Cseres-Gergely estimates a probit model for individual migration 
decision in which the local average wage and unemployment rate captures the 
“push” effect local labour market characteristics. Although the responses to 
these variables are found to be significant, their economic relevance is not 
substantial. Because of the individual data registered moves of various ranges, it 
was crucial for this result to hold to exclude those moving to the neighbouring 
settlements and commuting back to their previous place of living – usually a 
larger town. Apart from being limited to 1996 and the preceding periods, this 
study is limited by the fact that it is not clear what is the underlying population 
“at risk” of migration and what is the positive outcome we observe. Because the 
exact date of the move between 1990 and 1996 is not known, the population 
identified as movers include those moved twice only once and those moved to 
one place and returned subsequently do not count as movers. Also only wages 
and unemployment rates averaged over the 6 year period could be used, which 
possibly dampened the real effects quite substantially. 
 
AIM OF THE PAPER 
Stylised facts on migration are rather discouraging about the relevance of labour 
mobility in terms of its potential effect on regional differences. Nevertheless, 
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even in such a low rate of mobility, it is not clear what role labour market 
conditions and economic factors can play. Evidence so far is mixed and is based 
on non-current data. 
Can we hope that the usual labour market motives, wages and employment 
possibilities have the expected effect on mobility flows? How substantial is the 
adverse effect of distance on migration? Is the role house markets play in 
migration clear-cut? My aim here is to try to clarify these to a greater extent than 
it is available to date. Because of the very limited nature of the data at hand, I 
shall possibly not be able to get a comprehensive understanding of either of 
these phenomena, neither to model migration fully as such. What I hope is to 
improve our understanding compared to existing evidence on the role of labour 
market motivations. After a brief description of the data used and a theoretical 
motivation, I estimate a gravity-type model to explore the above questions. 
 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION AND DATA 
In the empirical section, I shall be using the well-known gravity model, the 
standard workhorse of migration research that has its roots deep in the history of 
the field. Originally based on an analogy with physics and Newton’s idea of 
gravitational force, it was following the work of Lowry (1966) that gravity 
models were extended with economic variables to represent push and pull 
effects. The central relationship is  
γ
ββ
ij
ji
ij d
PP
gm
′′′
=  
 
with mij being the flow from region i to region j, pi and pj being the respective 
“masses” and dij the distance between region i and region j. Although Newton’s 
theory restricted β’=β’’=1, we do have no reason to suppose so in a migration 
context. To obtain an equation that is estimable using standard techniques, this 
relation is transformed into a linear form by taking logs: 
ijjiij dPPm lnlnlnln γββα −′′+′+= . 
 
This is the relationship that Lowry extended by adding economic variables as 
the generalisations of Pi and Pj. Although venerable, the model in today’s world 
of very detailed micro-level data is considered to be outdated by many. 
Nevertheless, it is still used in cases when such data are not available – and this 
is one of such cases. Having access only to aggregate migration flows, the 
gravity model seems to be a natural candidate. 
9 
  
 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
In order to rid of the analogy from physics, the gravity model can be supported 
by a microeconomic model – if one accepts the assumptions that come with it. 
Although the end result is almost identical to the original model, one might hope 
that a formal exposition helps empirical investigation. In a study with similar 
motivation to mine, Fidrmuc and Huber (2003) neatly collect the pieces to 
characterise such a model. Their elaboration is in turn based on that of Fields 
(1979), with some useful verbosity. Here I only follow the most important points 
in their reasoning to expose the idea. 
The suggested chain of reasoning starts with a variant of the random utility 
model of McFadden (1973)5, where a decision-maker n living in place i is 
supposed to choose a place of living j among 1..J possible alternatives, based 
upon the expected utility that arises from living in a given place over some 
period of time. The utility derived from a move like that (in expectation, over a 
planning horizon) can be written as ( )njjijjnij CAYU μ,,, , , where Yj denotes income 
in j, Aj denotes amenities in j, Cij is moving costs from i to j, and μjn is an 
individual random draw from a preference/cost distribution. As the individual 
chooses the location that yields the highest utility, the Pij probability of moving 
to region j from i is 
( )[ ]iJiiijij UUUUP ,,,maxPr 21 L== . 
 
McFadden’s result is that if Uij is linear in the logarithms of the arguments and 
the logarithm of the original stochastic disturbance has an independent and 
identical Weibull distribution across alternatives, then the probability of moving 
from one place to the other is given by 
( )
( )
( )
( )∑∑
==
++
++== J
jk
ikkk
ijjj
J
k
ik
ij
ij
CYA
CYA
U
U
P
lnlnlnexp
lnlnlnexp
exp
exp
321
321
1
ααα
ααα
 
This form of the migration probability gives an easy formula for the probability 
of moving from i to j, relative to that of staying in i, a linear function of the 
differences of local characteristics: 
                                                 
5 Fields (1979) credits the application of the McFadden model to the migration problem to T. 
Paul Schultz (1977): “A Conditional Logit Model of Internal Migration: Venezuelan Lifetime 
Migration within Educational Strata” Economic Growth Center, Yale University, Discussion 
Paper No. 226, Sept. I could not, unfortunately, gain access to this material. 
10 
  
( ) ( ) ijjiji
ii
ij CYYAA
P
P
lnlnlnlnlnln 321 ααα +−+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 
If we do not wish to model the determinants of the number of stayers, we can 
make use of the fact that Pij is consistently estimated by the population ratio 
Mij/Ni, cancel denominators on the left hand side and collect Mii to the right. 
Relaxing the symmetry of the effect of sending and receiving regions and 
supposing a more general impact of the sending stayer population, an equation 
arises which is a good starting point for estimation: 
ijjijiijij CYYAAMM lnlnlnlnlnlnln 322110 βγβγββ +++++= . 
This equation is almost identical to the gravity formulation, except for here we 
have the number of stayers on the right hand side, whereas the gravity equation 
has the population for both the sending and the receiving region. Ak and Yk are 
just the generalisations of attraction forces associated with the destinations, and 
Cij encompasses all the costs of migration, including that captured by distance. 
By estimating the probability with observable quantities, the individual 
characteristics are aggregated as well: they correspond to individual values in 
the sending and receiving regions. 
Although we have just seen a nice microeconomic foundation to the gravity 
model, there is a very important assumption underlying the derivation, namely 
the independence of the individual utility component from all other components. 
Individual deviations from and the values of the representative (mean) 
characteristics of both sending and receiving regions in particular are assumed to 
be uncorrelated. This implies that migrants select themselves to better 
destinations based upon their fitness in the sending region. Such an assumption 
may or may not be valid, but we have to understand that it is built into the 
aggregation process. While this problem can be tackled with individual data, an 
aggregate analysis has to put up with the assumption only. 
Another property of the model results from the so called Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption of the individual model: characteristics of 
regions other than i and j do not affect flows between them. This is a similar 
assumption that is often made (and found wrong) in consumption analysis about 
zero cross-price effects. While it is theoretically possible and desirable to relax 
such an assumption, it is not clear how to deal with it in the current framework.6
 
                                                 
6 One could clearly continue the enumeration of difficulties: migration of families, not 
individuals; various migration motives that are only indirectly labour-market related, etc. 
These are issues that can be tackled either purely theoretically, or empirically using a 
specialised individual-level dataset, neither of which is an option here. 
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DATA 
To estimate the proposed model, I use data on county to county migration flows. 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is no available individual-level 
survey data that could be used to estimate migration responses reliably. 
Secondly using counties (as opposed to smaller units), it is almost certain that 
one does not have to worry about mobility that is actually connected to suburban 
relocation. Thirdly, available surveys on wages and employment are not 
designed to be representative at the level of micro-regions, the next possible 
smaller regional unit, therefore the estimate of the incentive variables can be 
precise in this case. Fourthly, although data on flows between NUTS 3 micro-
regions are collected by the respective authority, such data are not disclosed to 
the public due to confidentiality reasons. 
There are 20 counties (NUTS 2 regions) in Hungary, geographic units with 
comparable area and with an average population of around 500 thousand 
inhabitants. One exception from the rule is Budapest, which is a city with a 
population of 2 million and concentrating an atypically high level of economic 
activity as well. Data for the counties comes from several sources. The 
dependent variable is (the log of) the number of permanent migrants from 
county i to county j in year t. Data on these flows come from respective issues of 
the Demographic Yearbook of the Hungarian Statistics Office (HCSO). The 
TSTAR database of the HCSO and the IE-HAS, a yearly panel of from 1990 to 
2002 provides various data on settlements, which can be aggregated to the level 
of counties. The Wage Survey of the National Labour Centre provides yearly 
payroll wage data for firms with more than 11 employees between 1994 and 
2002. The Labour Force Survey of the Central Statistics Office, available for 4 
quarters a year between 1993 and 2002, provides employment data for at least 
80 thousand individuals each quarter. Yearly data on per square meter flat prices 
come from a database of the HCSO specialised on the flat market, available on 
CD-ROM. 
Finally, I created proximity data myself. Since in the case of large regional units, 
one can pick a continuous distance measure only in a very arbitrary way, I 
created a discrete proximity measure. This takes on the value 1, if two counties 
are adjacent (i.e. there is 1 border to cross to go from one to the other), 2 if there 
is one county “in between” (i.e. there are 2 borders to cross), and so forth. If 
there is more than one route from county i to county j, the shortest is chosen. 
The minimum proximity (maximum distance) is 6. 
The above data are assembled into a 3-way panel, spanning a total of 9 years and 
400 county to county flows, a total of 3600 observations. This means that every 
explanatory variable enters twice: once for the sending, secondly for the 
receiving region. Because moves within a region are not used for estimation 
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purposes and data are missing here and there, we end up with 3040 observations. 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
In the spirit of the model7 every variable enter in logs, and hence this qualifier is 
omitted in what follows. Using logs has the unfortunate feature that it excludes 
the case of zero migration from one region to the other. To treat this problem, 
often a Poisson regression is estimated on the level of migration flows, which is 
more plausibly thought of as count data in case of small regional units. In our 
case however there is no need to go beyond the linear regression framework. 
Because of the size of the regions and their distance from each other, there is 
very little chance of observing zero migration between regions (none such case 
in the actual data). Also because of this, treating the data as count has little 
relevance. 
The explanatory variables can be divided into four categories: gravity variables 
(population sizes and distance), labour market related-, housing market related-, 
and finally “other” indicators, mostly referring to (dis)amenities in the given 
county. 
I proxy local labour market conditions using wages and employment rates. 
Average wages (deflated to 1992 prices using the consumer price index), the 
unconditional expectations for the individual migrants, are calculated from the 
Wage Survey as a simple weighted average. Instead of unemployment, I use 
employment rates calculated from the yearly pooled samples of the LFS. 
Because unemployed and inactive persons has a very similar chance of 
obtaining a job in Hungary, neither the registered, nor the ILO-conform 
unemployment rate represents the true stance of the labour market (see 
Micklewright and Nagy, 1999). 
Based on the evidence and methods presented in Köllő (2004) and Nagy (2004), 
I have calculated an additional set of proxies of labour market conditions using 
the individual data of the Wage Survey and the Labour Force Survey, purged 
from composition effects. In the case of wages, I ran a very simple Mincerian 
wage regression with the log of gross monthly wages on the right hand side, 
schooling (below lower-secondary, upper-secondary, and higher education), 
potential experience (inferred from schooling) and potential experience squared, 
micro-region level local unemployment rate, gender-, industry- and county- 
dummies on the left hand side. The reference group was males working in 
agriculture with upper-secondary education. The parameters on county dummies 
became the “cleaned” representation of wages. In the case of employment, I 
                                                 
7 Schultz (1977) argues that it is especially appropriate to take logs of the right hand side 
variables in the present case. Because it is most probably expected income which a migrant 
takes into account when deciding upon a move, having average wages and (un)employment 
rate in a log-linear formulation allows for a flexible modelling of the multiplicative 
interaction. 
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used a logit model with schooling, age groups (16-25, 26-36, 37-50, 51-60), 
indicators for family status, gender and counties on the left-hand side. 
Although the causality is not understood in great detail, earlier work highlighted 
the fact that the state of the real estate market, most notably the flat market can 
have a great effect on migration and mobility as such. Kertesi (2000) argues that 
it is vacancy chains that are responsible for preventing mobility. Hegedűs (2004) 
stresses that changing flats is a risky business: the potential loss incurred in a 
less fortunate swap of flats can be prohibitively high for those in less favourable 
economic conditions. To proxy the effects of the property market, I include the 
number of flats built and demolished in an area. 
Also because living costs are possibly different in different regions, one would 
like to include a regional prices index in a migration analysis. This is 
unfortunately not possible, as such a measure does not exist. Instead of that, I 
use per square meter flat prices to proxy living expenses. Because of the 
regionally uniform structure of retail trade (with malls and suburban shopping 
centres emerging throughout the county), and the uniform pricing of utilities, 
flat prices are possibly one of the most important element of living expenses. 
Local amenities are represented by various factors characterising public goods, 
security of the locale and its desirability: the per capita number of general 
practitioners, paediatricians, equivalised number of tourists visiting the county 
representing “goods”, the number of criminal offences and suicides “bads”. 
These as always, are supposed to be characteristics that affect the desirability of 
a region, hence affecting the utility the potential migrant is able to derive from 
moving to a specific place. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The theoretical motivation presented in the previous section yielded an equation 
that is estimable using simple linear regression techniques. Before proceeding 
with estimation, we have to specify the stochastic structure of the problem. 
Because of the availability of panel data, this can be a fairly general form: 
ijtijtijtjtitjtitijtijt efgCYYAAMM ++++++++= lnlnlnlnlnlnln 322110 βγβγββ , 
where – in addition to the already discussed variables – we have a time fixed-
effect gt and a county or county-pair (“route”) specific effect fij, potentially 
correlated with the included regressors. Theory does not advise us which one to 
use among the latter two, although Mátyás (1997) suggests the county-specific 
ones. Although it captures a greater amount of specific effects, the drawback of 
using the route-specific effects is that the effect of proximity (as well as other 
time-invariant variables) can not be identified. 
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES FROM DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS 
The first column of Table 1 presents a model estimate including the number of 
stayers, average earnings and employment rates in the sending (i) and the 
receiving (j) counties, as well as the proximity measures, along with county-
effects. The results are in line with what we expect when interpreting wages and 
employment possibilities as push and pull effects. 
Table 1: Parameter estimates of a gravity-type model on a panel of 
Hungarian counties 1994-2001; model 1 estimated with county fixed effects 
for sending and receiving counties, all others with flow (“bilateral”) fixed 
effects; all continuous variables are in logs 
 
 1 2 2C 2TE 3 3a 
Number of stayers 0.953* 0.625** 0.602** 0.988** 0.467 0.853** 
 (0.377) (0.218) (0.221) (0.238) (0.313) (0.303) 
Average earnings – i -0.251 -0.239** -0.177+ 0.111 -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.157) (0.085) (0.107) (0.120) (0.117) (0.112) 
Average earnings – j 0.319* 0.316** 0.116 0.682** 0.088 0.229* 
 (0.156) (0.085) (0.107) (0.120) (0.118) (0.113) 
Employment rate – i 0.184 0.177 -0.123** -0.094 -0.433* -0.181 
 (0.244) (0.133) (0.042) (0.157) (0.212) (0.202) 
Employment rate – j 0.592* 0.582** 0.106* 0.315* 0.036 0.049 
 (0.244) (0.133) (0.042) (0.157) (0.212) (0.202) 
Proximity=2 -1.326**      
 (0.020)      
Proximity=3 -1.697**      
 (0.020)      
Proximity=4 -1.914**      
 (0.025)      
Proximity=5 -2.145**      
 (0.036)      
Proximity=6 -2.344**      
 (0.062)      
Property price (per sq m) - i     0.093**  
     (0.033)  
Property price (per sq m) - j     -0.037  
     (0.033)  
No. of flats constructed - i     -0.011  
     (0.023)  
No. of flats constructed - i     0.089**  
     (0.023)  
Constant -3.375 -3.808 -2.620 -16.004** -3.030 -8.572* 
 (5.334) (2.786) (2.884) (3.516) (4.036) (3.870) 
Observations 3420 3420 3240 3420 2280 2280
R-squared 0.90 0.02 0,01 0.05 0.03 0.01
Number of i to j pairs 380 380 380 380 380
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note that R2 in model (1) takes the effect of the dummies explicitly into account 
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The parameter on the number of stayers is almost unity. Although neither labour 
market variable shows significant effect in the sending region, they both have a 
positive coefficient in the receiving region, attracting the inflow of migrants. 
Proximity has a similarly expected effect. Although the difference in marginal 
effects is more or less constant for the included indicators (2 and up), there is a 
great jump from the first neighbour to the second – just as raw data suggests. 
The second column presents almost the same specification, the difference being 
that instead of county-specific effects, I use route-specific (“bilateral”) ones and 
proximity measures are of course absent.8 The results are fairly similar to what 
we obtained previously, with the exception that the parameter on wages in the 
sending region has a significant and negative coefficient, as expected. 
Note that time effects were not included either in this, or in the previous 
specification. The reason for that is the variation in the right-hand side variables 
comes partly from the time dimension and the time effects absorb that to a great 
extent. The third column, labelled 2TE shows the second set of estimates using 
time effects as well. This results in a drop of significance of wage in the sending 
region, an increase in the effect of receiving region wages, and a decrease in its 
employment rate. Because my preference is to capture the effect of labour 
market variables and because the results do not seem to change substantially, I 
prefer to drop time effects. 
As already mentioned, Köllő (2004) and Nagy (2004) show that regional 
differences on the NUTS 1 level change if we filter out composition effects. To 
check how such a treatment affects estimation results, I re-estimated model 2 
using the cleaned wage and employment rate variables (see the previous section 
for a description of the process). Results under heading 2C show a diminished 
effect, with a slightly changed pattern of significance. Employment rates in both 
sending and receiving regions are significant, while wages in the receiving reg-
ion ceased to be so. 
Just as the theoretical discussion suggests, I wanted to include variables to 
capture the effect of amenities present in both the sending and the receiving 
location, such as the (per capita) number of doctors, crimes, suicides, visitor-
nights. Unfortunately neither of these variables proved to have a significant 
effect on the flows, which is again a result of their relative stability over time. 
                                                 
8 Because a Hausman test rules out simple OLS and random-effect GLS estimation, it is only 
the different fixed effect estimators I consider. In case of the fixed effect estimators however, 
one might raise the objection that if we believe that the equilibrating effect of migration works 
through the labour marker, we should not use those, since the regressors’ strict exogeneity 
might be violated through simultaneous determination of migration, wages and employment 
chances. Although this is a theoretically sound critique, I believe it can safely be ignored in 
the current case where the level of migration is extremely low. Since only a tiny fraction of a 
population leaves through a given route (or at all, for that matter), its impact on the local 
labour market is probably negligible. 
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Also because of this, we can hope that the included fixed effects capture their 
effects well enough – indeed, a Hausman test against either the OLS or the 
random-effects alternative favour fixed effects. Results are not shown for this 
specification. 
Even if the effect of amenities is stable over time, there is an important factor 
influencing mobility, namely cost of living. This, as already mentioned, 
manifests itself to a great extent in housing costs. Housing however plays a 
double role in the migration decision. High property prices increase the cost of 
rental, but given that most Hungarian households are owner-occupiers, this is 
not a significant factor. Property is more relevant when looked upon as an asset 
the household. Hegedűs (2004) shows that it is to a great extent the risk 
associated with selling the old and purchasing the new property, thereby a 
potential loss of a great part of their most important asset is what discourages 
people from moving house. If nevertheless the decision on moving is made, 
income from selling house is one of the most important assets the household can 
draw upon to finance the move to either jumpstart a new life in a more 
promising, or in a less expensive location. Housing markets have another 
important effect on migration. As in many countries, migration in and outflow is 
highly correlated in Hungary. Both Kertesi (2000) and Hegedűs (2004) note this 
feature and attribute it to vacancy chain-effects. Because of the limited 
availability of housing, it is to a great extent moving households that free up 
space for those looking for available property. 
To control for these effects, the specification shown in Table 1 under heading 3 
includes per square meter housing prices as well as flats constructed for both 
sending and receiving counties. Because property prices are available only from 
1997 on, column 3a shows results from specification 2 constrained to this 
period. Two of new variables have significant effects, property prices in the 
sending and construction in the receiving region. The latter has a positive 
parameter, which is in line with the vacancy-chain effect and scarcity of flats. 
The positive effect of property prices in the sending region also point towards 
the expected direction. 
While adding the new variables allow identifying property-market effects, they 
also render formerly significant labour-market effects insignificant. This is 
partly a result of their initially low variation and slightly different behaviour in 
the period starting in 1997 (see column 3a), but also that of the correlation 
between wages and property prices. It is interesting to note that it is the second 
specification where employment rate in the sending region has a significant 
effect, comparable in absolute size to that of employment in the receiving reg-
ion, when significant. 
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SENSITIVITY OF THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
There are a number of ways the stability of the estimates can be checked. One 
obvious but unfortunately infeasible one is to include additional regressors to 
measure unobserved effects. As the spatial unit which data refers to is not 
numerous, such attempts failed. 
Unfortunately the relative scarcity of the data appears in other ways, too. When 
using panel data, one might want to check whether the poolability restriction 
implicit in panel estimation holds true. Although even setting the breakpoint in 
the middle of the time period left what appears to be an insufficient number of 
observations (significance of most parameters drop considerably), there is a 
clear pattern emerging. Until around 1998, it is only employment in the 
receiving region that has an effect on migration. Wages seem to gain importance 
only after that – a factor that can be connected to the start of economic growth. 
Poolability is thus strictly speaking seems to be violated but not to an extent that 
would affect qualitative conclusions. 
Poolability might be a question not only in time, but also in terms of other 
attributes, such as space or economic performance. Because Budapest and Pest 
county are very special in many ways (exceptional economic performance and 
the only unit of observation where suburban mobility might be relevant), I 
repeated the estimation leaving out flows from or to any or both of these 
counties, or flows between them. In all of these experiments the (qualitative) 
results were unchanged. Another sensible division is to consider sending 
counties to the west and to the east to the river Danube. Because the east is 
traditionally more agricultural oriented and is in a generally worse economic 
condition, one might think that motives work in a different way here and there. 
The results are surprisingly similar to that what we experienced when cutting the 
sample half in time. It is only employment in the receiving region that seems to 
matter in the west, but almost all of the factors play an important part in the east. 
One might also argue that wages have different meaning if agents have full 
access to credit markets and when they do not – indeed, such a finding is a 
cornerstone in the Andrienko and Guriev (2003) study. To check the possibility 
of such an effect, I separated the counties in terms of their per capita GDP into 
two groups. Moving the divisor line to separate the best 13 from the others to the 
best 7 from the others, one can observe a shift from the effect of employment 
possibilities (especially in the receiving region) to the effect of wages in both 
places. 
Yet another doubt might be raised due to the arbitrariness of the labour market 
variables. Why do we think that it is wages and employment rate that represent 
the chances of a potential employee most faithfully? Why not use for example 
local GDP, or income tax per taxpayer instead of wages, or unemployment rate 
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instead of employment rate? Checking for their validity, I used all of them, 
replacing the original variables. The qualitative results again did not change 
much, although some variables were “stronger” then others. This is especially 
true for unemployment, which seemed to dominate wages, rendering them 
insignificant, which can be attributed to the more direct connection between the 
pressure of unemployment on wages than the one coming through inactivity, an 
important contributor to the employment rate. 
All of the above results suggest that although the pooled model gives a sensible 
description of the overall migration, it would be useful to differentiate impacts 
on the basis of time-periods and wealth of the regions. Such an attempt however 
failed for two possible reasons. One of these is that if we differentiate in both 
respects, too great degrees of freedom are used and impacts are not significant 
any more. The second possibility is that also the stochastic structure of the 
respective groups is different and not differentiating this have adverse effects on 
the estimates. 
Although we have seen a number of sensible and significant effects in the above 
results, one might ask whether the estimated parameters imply a significant 
effect on migration in terms of its impact. Looking at the problem from a labour 
market perspective, one has to consider that the intensity of migration itself is 
rather low in Hungary and that its reach decays rapidly with distance. If the 
destination is not in an adjacent county, there is a more than 1 percent penalty on 
migration. Because of this, its equilibrating effect can be high only if we observe 
great changes as a response to incentives. 
The estimates suggest that differences between average earnings have to 
increase by 3 percent to raise migration flow by 1 percent in a given direction. 
Looking at the evolution of wages, such change is entirely plausible. Average 
wages in Budapest were by around 48 percent higher in 1992 than in Nógrád, 
one of the poorest counties. This difference grew to 80 percent in a decade. 
Although the original difference was great enough, it also widened over time. 
This comparison is biased however, because Budapest, Pest county, and some 
other counties in the Western-Transdanubia experienced the greatest economic 
growth, so their advantage in wages is overwhelming. However, there are 
differences even among the less well to do counties: Hajdú, for example, one of 
the most eastern counties, has a steady 3-4 percent advantage in average wages 
over Békés, its southern neighbour – enough to generate some difference. 
Another perspective is provided by results from other studies relating to CEE 
countries. Although differences in regional units and other methodological 
differences render a comparison imperfect, we can use results from Fidrmuc 
(2002) and Andrienko and Guriev (2003) for a tentative attempt. These show 
that the measured impact of economic incentives is not too small: parameters 
measured there rarely exceed unity, and are mostly close to what is obtained he-
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re. One has to keep in mind however, that they include many more regressors, 
whose effect is nevertheless not always significant. 
Then why is so migration low? Clearly, there are numerous factors that are not 
included in the analysis and these have positive as well as negative impact on 
migration. Secondly, although differences in employment possibilities have 
higher impact than wages, differences are not so great in those. Thirdly, here we 
measured the extent to which labour market factors increase or decrease 
migration relative to an “autonomous” base level. Because this level is rather 
small, it remains small unless we multiply it by an enormous number – an 
impact not observed in real data. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we looked at county to county migration in Hungary. Although 
regional differences in labour market indicators seem to increase rather than 
diminish over time, migration rate is small and stable. Previous studies of 
Hungarian migration either focus on earlier periods, such as the first half of the 
1990s, or use data in which imperfect measurement does not allow the clear 
interpretation of results. In the current paper I used aggregate data to estimate 
the effect of economic incentives on migration flows. Using counties as the unit 
of analysis has various drawbacks, but also makes it possible to exclude the 
effect of relocation to suburban green-belts, a dominant feature of Hungarian 
mobility that would introduce apparently perverse labour maker effects. 
To measure the extent of labour market incentives, I estimated a gravity model 
in log-linear form, relating place to place migration flows to several “push” and 
“pull” effects, wages and employment/unemployment being the most important. 
Although low variation in the regressors prevented the inclusion of several 
potentially important factors, there are several robust results emerging. 
According to these both wage differentials and differences in employment rates 
encourage migration between counties. Although there is no sign of evidence 
running against this in the earlier 1990s, the relationship seems to stabilise 
chiefly from 1998 on. 
The property market is also found to have an important effect on migration. 
People move away from counties where property prices are high, possibly 
because of higher living expenses or because by moving to a cheaper 
neighbourhood, they can obtain a stream of income from the profit realised in 
swapping flats. Construction of property was found to have a positive effect on 
inflow of migrants, which is in line with previous evidence on vacancy-chain 
effects. 
Even though labour market incentives were found to have a significant effect on 
migration, the estimated model has a fairly weak explanatory power. There are 
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so many factors affecting (or not affecting) migration in Hungary, that such 
incentives alone are very unlikely generate a stream of migrants that would 
possibly able to reduce regional inequalities. 
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APPENDIX  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE 
ANALYSIS 
 
Variable (in log) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Migration 4940 4.60 1.2 0 10.088
Stayers 4940 12.98 .492 12.01 14.52
Average wage 3800 9.94 .154 9.69 10.52
Employment rate 3800 -.605 .103 -.899 -.417
Flat price (per square 
meter) 
2280 2.97 .347 2.202 3.79
Flats constructed 4940 6.93 .689 5.193 8.85
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